



SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME

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Literature review of factors associated with radicalisation (Rand Europe)

A. Introduction

Terrorism is currently perceived as one of the greatest threats to the safety and security of European member states. This state of affairs was triggered by major attacks carried out by the Al-Qaeda (AQ) network including the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the USA, the Atocha rail bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and the attacks in the UK on the London underground in July 2005. The more recent attack in Norway by Anders Breivik in July 2011 has made clear that terrorist attacks designed to cause mass casualties are not solely linked to networked violent Islamist movements, but also lie within the capability of lone actors, associated in this case with extreme right-wing ideology.

In order to tackle the threat of terrorism to European member states, it is essential to develop an understanding of the process that drives some radicals to extremism and violence, and exceptionally, terrorism. Radicalisation is not synonymous with violence and terrorism; many radicalised individuals are and will remain pacifists.¹ This report describes work in which RAND Europe examined the factors identified in the political science literature as contributing to the radicalisation of individuals who are known to have engaged in a terrorist or violent act as part of terrorist groups espousing a range of ideologies. It draws on research conducted on publicly available documents but is limited in what it can report due to the European classification assigned to the research.

The report applies a scientific eye to the existing political science literature. It brings a much needed contribution to a field in which scientific works are outnumbered by commentaries. While both have a place it is essential to question what factors are linked to violent radicals and terrorists (as opposed to radicals who do not advocate or believe in the use of violence), which factors are correlated with violent extremism and terrorism, plus which are or may be causal, and finally, which factors distinguish violent radicals and terrorists from the rest of the population.

B. Methodology

The Research Team identified the factors reported to be associated with radicalisation leading to violence or terrorism through a two-staged approach. First, identifying and reviewing the political science literature on 'factors of radicalisation in individuals' available in academic journals, books and 'grey' literature.² We included in this study only those reports that were concerned with radicalised individuals who had engaged in violent extremist or terrorist acts, or acts related to violent extremism or terrorism.

¹ See the European Convention on Human Rights, articles 9-11 (accessed from www.hrcr.org/docs/Eur_Convention/euroconv.html on February 22 2011).

² Literatures apposite to the political science literature provide insight into radicalisation, including that on vulnerability to indoctrination and early development of criminal careers. However, this was outside the scope of SAFIRE.

Second, the content of the literature³ was quantified in order to explore the frequency in the reporting of factors and the level of correlation between these.⁴ Table 1 provides an overview of the type of sources reviewed, and Table 2 identifies the sampling populations in the primary studies.

Table 1 Description of the literature by research type

Autobiographies	3
Primary research (interviews)	11
<i>Of which had a control group</i>	1
Secondary research	40
<i>Of which benchmarked the sample against the general population</i>	2

Table 2 Description of the literature by sampling population (in the case of primary research)⁵

Community stakeholders	7
Government representatives	5
Community leaders	3
Experts	3
Individuals considered radical by intelligence services	3
Terrorists (incarcerated)	2
Journalists	1
Industry representatives	1
Project staff	1

As the study rests on a literature review of 66 sources from the field of political science, the findings reflect the factors that are reported within this specific literature as being associated with radicalisation. These factors do not necessarily cause radicalisation but may instead be proximate factors. In fact, only a minority of the studies that were reviewed assessed causality. Similarly, other relevant factors may not have been observed or reported by political science researchers. In addition, as the literature was quantitatively analysed, the factors that were found to be key correspond to those that were most frequently reported in the literature and not necessarily those that are reported to be the greatest contributors to radicalisation leading to violence or terrorism.

In order to categorise the factors reported to be associated with radicalisation leading to violence or terrorism, we developed a conceptual framework for the process of radicalisation. Although many frameworks have been developed over the years, they are often specific to a type of radicalisation (i.e. a group or movement driven by a particular ideology). These frameworks nonetheless share commonalities used to

³ We used binary coding attributing a '1' to factors reported in the literature and a '0' to factors that were not reported in the literature that we reviewed.

⁴ The analysis of associations was carried out using the Phi-correlations coefficient. The results from the Phi-correlations were then tested for significance with the Fisher's exact test.

⁵ The number of sample does not match the number of primary studies as any given study may have conducted research on a number of different population samples (e.g. community stakeholders and government representatives). While it would be interesting to understand the main sampling populations on which the secondary literature is based as well as those on which the primary literature is based, the scope of our work did not permit this.

develop an overarching framework that could make sense of the diversity of factors reported in the literature.⁶ This framework, represented in Figure 1, includes three stages:⁷

1. The *background stage* refers to the period during which an individual may already be radicalised but there is no observable or reported internal consideration of engaging in violence or terrorism to further their radical objectives.
2. The *proximate stage* refers to the period during which an individual starts showing or reports considering engaging in violence or terrorism to further their radical objectives.
3. The *immediate stage* refers to the period during which an individual is ready to commit violence or terrorism to further their radical objectives. These factors can only be interpreted as being immediate after their participation in violent extremism or terrorism.

The framework used also helps identify the radicalisation process as being both:


- *Non-linear and non-deterministic*: In theory individuals can turn away or be pushed away from further radicalisation at each and every stage of the process. They may never complete the process, they may leave it completely and never return or they could reenter it at any stage after an absence.⁸
- *Dynamic*: An individual's radicalisation is affected by groups' demand for their skills and the affinity between the individuals and the group. Individuals' radicalisation can also be affected by policies and interventions to prevent, halt or reverse radicalisation. There is an interplay between both endogenous and exogenous factors.

⁶ The framework has been designed drawing on well-known frameworks including amongst others Mogaddham's staircase (2005), Silber and Bhatt's four stage process (2007), and Kruglanski and Fishman's adaptation of Maslow's hierarchy of needs (2009).

⁷ These stages are not clearly delineated and they include some overlap.

⁸ There is an on-going academic debate in the literature concerning whether individuals can skip stages or elements in the radicalisation process, or whether they go through these at varying speeds, including exceptionally fast speeds that appears to suggest a stage may have been skipped when it has not. This framework does not attempt to resolve this on-going question.

Figure 1 – The framework in which the process of radicalisation operates



Source: RAND Europe (2011)

C. Results

This section reports on the most prominent findings from the review of factors reported to be associated with radicalisation leading to violence or terrorism. Below are described the most frequently reported factors, the significant correlations between these factors and, where relevant, the key distinctions and similarities between terrorist groups driven by different ideologies.

Islamist terrorism

Islamist terrorism is a product of a religious extremist ideology that proposes violence as the main means to establish a single global Islamic state. Its transnational nature makes it stand out from other national or regional terrorist movements. Its origins date back to the 1940s, in particular to the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Palestine. Its significance began to increase in 1979 following the Iranian Revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Islamist terrorism today constitutes the most widespread terrorist threat. This has been highlighted by large-scale attacks in the USA (especially on 9/11), in Europe (Spain and the UK) and other countries across the world (Kenya, Turkey, Jordan to name but a few).

The literature on Islamist terrorism reports almost invariably – and perhaps unsurprisingly - that terrorists demonstrated a keen interest in religion during their radicalisation. The literature also reports that it is common for Islamist terrorists to use the internet to inform, reinforce and harden their beliefs.⁹ The literature identifies that later changes in behaviour regularly precede terrorist acts, including more frequent and longer travel to specific destinations, for example to access training camps abroad. The

⁹ Although this factor was only reported frequently in the literature in relation to Islamist terrorism, this is likely to be due to the fact that the literature related to the movement driven by other ideologies is older in nature, often preceding the widespread access to the internet that characterises the 21st century.

literature suggests that receiving the means to engage in terrorism (whether financial, material or infrastructural) frequently enables such travels.

The literature also reports on findings that relate to the life course of the individual. When individuals are reported to be public about their radicalisation from an early stage (for example, by joining social movements or publicly expressing how they see their local issues linking to wider international issues), they are reportedly more likely to be public about their desire to commit violence or terrorism (for example, by expressing their desire to attack particular targets). Similarly, the literature also reports that events that are considered meaningful to the development of an individual's radicalisation can sometimes provide the trigger for moving from words to actions in the later stages.

For example, if an individual starts condoning violence as a means to an end following an important political event or its anniversary, such as the death of a political activist, they are reportedly more likely to engage in violence themselves in and around the same or similar event in the future. Finally, where the internet is involved, it is associated with a greater likelihood of desensitization to undertaking a violent or terrorist act.

Nationalist-separatist terrorism

In contrast to Islamist terrorism, nationalist-separatist terrorism manifests itself more locally, focusing on national or regional issues. The causes that nationalist-separatist organisations fight for are as diverse as their geographies, ranging from demands for a unified 'Thirty-two County' Irish Republic (IRA and others), the unification and independence of the Basque regions of Spain and France (ETA), and the independence from Turkey of the Kurdish provinces in the south-west of the country (PKK). Another distinction from Islamist terrorism is that nationalist-separatist terrorist organisations tend to be factions that have splintered off from more peaceful political movements after concluding that peaceful means to bring about change have failed.

The literature suggests that the radicalisation of nationalist-separatist terrorists is often a highly politicised process that starts during childhood, in the family environment. The move from peaceful to violent is reportedly linked to a personal traumatic experience such as the death of a family member as a consequence of the nationalist struggle or the experience of war, including having to seek refuge. Perhaps unsurprisingly, nationalist-separatist terrorists are characterised by the literature as having a history of political activism, and a strong feeling of political impotence.

Right-wing terrorism

The idea of the 'extreme right' is a somewhat disparate concept rather than a monolithic entity. It encompasses a broad range of groups and associated issues linked to fascism, xenophobia and racism. Much of the concern regarding right-wing terrorism initially dates back to the 1970s and 1980s, with the German, Italian and French movements. However, extreme right-wing terrorism remains a threat today, particularly from Neo-Nazi groups in Europe.

Political factors were – perhaps unsurprisingly – reported to be key amongst right-wing terrorists, from initially strong political activism to considering the use of violence, usually as a result of feeling both politically impotent and from fear of their political

opponents. In addition, the literature frequently reported that right-wing terrorists combined a proneness to violence with criminality, that their growing radicalisation resulted from the experience of a politically meaningful event such as police violence against them during protests, and that it had been reinforced by receiving training in the use of violent tactics.

Left-wing terrorism

Left-wing terrorism is similarly politically motivated but it tends to be driven by a more unified ideology. The extreme left, particularly in its violent form, has a long history dating back to the various communist, anarchist and nihilist movements of the 19th century. More recent extreme left-wing terrorism in Europe emerged from the 'New Left' movement and student protests of the late 1960s. Extreme left wing groups and individuals tend to believe that the only way to change the existing establishment is through violent action against the state and its representatives.

Political and ideological factors were reported as frequently being observed amongst left-wing terrorists and commonly expressed at public demonstrations. There are numerous accounts in the literature of individuals who had a history of strong political engagement when they turned radical and who then began to consider the use of violence as a result of feeling politically impotent in effecting the changes they wished to see. The occurrence of a politically meaningful event, often involving death, is frequently reported to precede the move from words to action.

Single issue terrorism

Single-issue terrorism is distinct in two main ways from other groups discussed in this chapter. First, single-issue terrorists generally engage in actions that are closer to violent extremism than to terrorism, often targeting property and producing casualties on a smaller scale and a less indiscriminate basis. Second, single-issue terrorists can also become lone actors by splintering from their group of political activists; this is less common with animal rights and environmental groups however.

Perhaps the most striking finding in the literature on single-issue terrorism is the frequency with which terrorists who were not reported to hold religious beliefs were described as holding apocalyptic beliefs. This finding corroborates previous research (Lee and Simms 2007) which suggests that this combination of factors correlates with violence. The literature on single-issue terrorism also suggests that terrorists tend to have a history of political activism through which they blame their contemporary society for the issues with which they are concerned.

New religious terrorist movements

New Religious Movements (NRMs), or cults, are rarely considered in traditional terrorism terms. Nevertheless, throughout modern history, these groups have engaged in violence that can be described as terrorism, for example the case of the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan and a number of 'Christian Identity' groups in USA such as the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord. New religious movements historically stand out by their inward focus: they do not tend to be concerned with the society in which their group evolves or be motivated by issues that concern the mainstream. More typically, cult members are consumed by the beliefs that are communicated to them by

their leader. They often consider this person to be 'divine', acting as the messenger of a higher entity.

As could be expected, a fascination with spirituality as well as the role of social influence and obedience were reported in the literature as key characteristics of terrorists from new religious movements.

Table 3 and Table 4 list all of the factors that were reported in the literature, and identify how frequently each one was mentioned for each type of terrorism investigated. We identify the following factors

- rarely or not mentioned in relation to terrorists of each type (represented by a blank circle)
- occasionally mentioned (through a circle that is 25% full)
- more frequently cited factors (through a circle 50% full)
- the most frequently common factors (through a circle 75% full).

The previous description of factors key to each terrorist type highlighted those factors that were most common for each particular type, regardless of their specific occurrence. The conclusion section below, which follows the tables, highlights those factors that are most frequently cited across all the terrorist types examined.

Table 3 Background factors reported to be associated with radicalisation leading to violence

	Factor	Islamist Terrorism	National Separatist Terrorism	Right-wing Terrorism	Left-wing Terrorism	Single Issue Terrorism	New Religious Movement Terrorism
Background	Fascination with Spirituality/Religion	●	○	○	○	●	●
	Prone to Violence	●	●	●	○	○	○
	Helping Kin	●	●	○	○	○	○
	Fascination with Leaders	●	●	○	○	○	○
	Event Occurrence	●	●	●	○	○	○
	Poverty	●	○	○	●	○	○
	Political Activity	○	●	●	●	●	○
	Politicised Upbringing	○	●	○	○	○	○
	Seeking Int'l Recognition	○	●	○	○	○	○
	Fascination with Revolutions	○	●	○	○	○	○
	Rural Residence	○	●	●	○	○	○
	Employment	○	○	●	○	○	●
	Poor education	○	○	○	●	○	○
	Higher education	○	○	○	●	○	●
	Imprisonment	○	●	○	○	○	○
	Unstable upbringing	○	●	○	○	○	○
	Blaming society	○	○	○	○	●	○
	Being Prone to Criminality	○	○	●	○	○	○

 = Observed in 75% + of all observations
  = Observed in 50 - 75% of all observations
 = Observed in 25 - 50% of all observations
  = Observed in 0 - 25% of all observations

Source: RAND Europe (2011)

Table 4 Proximate and immediate factors reported to be associated with radicalisation leading to violence

	Factor	Islamist Terrorism	National Separatist Terrorism	Right-wing Terrorism	Left-wing Terrorism	Single Issue Terrorism	New Religious Movement Terrorism
Proximate	Apocalyptic beliefs	○	○	○	○	◐	○
	Linking the local to the int'l	◐	◐	○	○	○	○
	Social influence	◐	○	○	○	○	◐
	Desensitization	◐	◐	○	○	○	○
	Event Occurrence	◐	◐	○	○	○	◐
	Search for Meaning	◐	○	○	○	○	○
	Training	◐	◐	◐	○	○	○
	Lacking Political Clout	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	○
	Internet Use	◐	○	○	○	○	○
	Reinforcement of an insurgent movement	◐	◐	○	○	○	○
	Receiving means	◐	○	○	○	○	○
	Seeking military help	○	◐	○	○	○	○
	Fearing Opponents	○	○	◐	○	○	○
	Immediate	Expressing targets	◐	◐	○	○	○
Shared Vision		◐	◐	○	○	○	○
Event Occurrence		◐	◐	○	◐	○	○
Obedience		○	○	○	○	○	◐
Out of routine behaviour		◐	◐	○	○	○	○

= Observed in 75%+ of all observations
 = Observed in 50 - 75% of all observations
 = Observed in 25 - 50% of all observations
 = Observed in 0 - 25% of all observations

Source: RAND Europe (2011)

D. Conclusion

The findings suggest that whereas similarities exist between types of terrorist, there is no single, unifying 'terrorist profile' that could help predict who will become a violent radical or a terrorist. We did not identify in the literature any single factor, across the range of terrorist groups, that is frequently associated with radicalisation leading to violence or terrorism. Additionally, we did not find any identified single 'terrorist pathway' that violent radicals and terrorists tend to follow. Indeed, we found no combination of 'terrorism factors' that repeated itself across terrorist groups.

The literature nonetheless suggests key commonalities across radical groups. The factor most frequently reported to be associated with radicalisation leading to violence or terrorism is the perceived impotence to effect desired political change. It was reported on average in 50% to 75% of the literature for four of the six terrorist movements that we examined (excluding Single Issue and New Religious terrorist movements). Past training activity, political activity, a proneness to violence and the experience of politically meaningful and negative events were also commonly observed amongst terrorists; these factors were reported in 50% to 75% of the literature pertaining to three of the six terrorist groups examined. Importantly, these factors do not necessarily cause violent extremism and terrorism, and they may not help distinguish violent radicals and terrorists given that they could be common in other sub-groups of the population such as peaceful radicals.

As for potential pathways to radicalisation leading to violence or terrorism, a limited number of common factors were identified that are confined only to the Islamist and right-wing terrorism literatures. First, our review found that some Islamist terrorists appeared to follow a public radicalisation process: they were reported to publicly express their radical beliefs, their consideration of violence as a means to an end, and finally their commitment to using violence. Similarly, both Islamist and right-wing terrorists that furthered their radicalisation as a result of experiencing a negative and politically meaningful event, often related to death, were frequently reported to commit violence or terrorism following the recurrence of this or a similar event.

While a few other possible pathways were identified and are reported above in the results section, these were tautological in nature and were not meaningful in the context of our research. The fact that the number of meaningful identified pathways is limited suggests that there is a wide range of routes into violent extremism and terrorism. As for those pathways that have been identified, whereas they may prove to be useful *indicators* for radicals who are considering violence as a means to an end, they cannot necessarily predict who will move from words to action.

A literature review and analysis of intervention programmes to counter radicalisation (ISCA)

A. Introduction

In this chapter the work, conducted by ISCA, aimed to review the programmes reported in the literature to intervene in radicalisation. We classified the programmes into three groups: those that were *preventative*, targeting apparent contextual factors; *restorative*, applying soft measures to individuals showing apparent signs of radicalisation; and *suppressive*, imposing hard measures such as restrictions and sanctions (adapted from (Lousberg et al. 2007)).

The review describes 87 interventions. This Inventory of Interventions is made up mostly of community-oriented programmes, though we also included some governmental efforts because, while with a different scope, these are also interventions and lend valuable knowledge to the research. These interventions provide input to Work Package 3, which compared and contrasted these in order to inform the design of interventions for the empirical work in Work Package 5. It also contributes to the literature by providing a centralised overview of radicalisation interventions reported in the open access literature.

B. Methodology

We inventoried 87 past and current interventions. Twenty-five of these reportedly targeted violent extremists and/or terrorists. Sixty-two targeted individuals considered to be at risk of violent extremism and/or terrorism, and reported focussing on engagement and/or radicalisation, the difference being that engagement – more than radicalisation – refers to individuals who are more extreme on the radicalisation scale and more likely to use or seriously consider using violence to achieve their goals. The majority of interventions (N = 47) reportedly attempted to address both disengagement and deradicalisation, 31 reported focussing on deradicalisation only and 9 on disengagement only.¹⁰

The interventions were described in terms of their:

- goals,
- methods (including the major factors manipulated),
- target audience (including whether individuals or groups/communities),
- stage of radicalisation being targeted,
- behaviour sought to be influenced,
- location,
- and intervening actors.

¹⁰ The main focus of the interventions is not always explicit in the description of the interventions and was derived from ISCA's understanding of their aim.

The interventions relevant to SAFIRE were categorized into the following eight groups:

- **Islamist:** many interventions into radicalisation, underpinned by an extremist interpretation of Islam, involve local community members or other credible Muslim figures presenting credible, alternative Islamic ideologies which de-glamourise terrorism. Some interventions in such cases also focus on providing alternative outlets for socialising, channelling energy and expressing dissent.
- **Nationalist/separatist:** British and Irish interventions have released Loyalist and Republican prisoners and encouraged them to eschew extremism.
- **Right wing:** interventions into cases of right wing extremism target youth whose primary motivations are typically social rather than ideological. As with 'Islamist interventions', former extremists or family members tend to be involved.
- **Left-wing:** Columbian government interventions aimed at entire left-wing paramilitary groups, whose members they aim to disengage and reintegrate into society.
- **Gangs/Criminals:** although gang membership or criminal activity does not necessarily imply radicalisation, interventions targeted at such groups are examined because they often employ some concepts and methods similar to counter radicalisation interventions (as described above).
- **Interventions taking place in correction facilities:** law enforcement work by police and in prisons presents opportunities for preventative, curative and repressive interventions.
- **Early interventions for a peaceful coexistence:** these interventions aim to facilitate peaceful coexistence by educating both sides about the true nature of the other, preferably at a young age before they are more vulnerable to becoming radicalised.
- **Generic interventions:** some interventions target the process of radicalisation in general, regardless of association, in preventive, curative or repressive ways.

It is worth noting that very few interventions are suppressive in nature; they tend to be preventive or restorative.

Table 5 presents an overview of the interventions found in the literature.

Table 5. List of interventions identified in the literature¹¹

Type of intervention → Intervention target group ↓	Preventative	Restorative	Suppressive
Islamist terrorism interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The Radical Middle Way – Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare – Youth Exchange and Study – Special Track Risk Youths – CONTEST Strategy – Prevent – Quilliam Foundation – Project Griffin – Common Purpose International Navigator Programme – Futurebuilders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare – Egypt deradicalisation interventions – Yemeni Committee for Dialogue – Thailand's deradicalisation interventions – Special Track Risk Youths 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Sakinah Campaign – Active Change Foundation – CONTEST Strategy – Pursue – Indonesian deradicalisation interventions

¹¹ References to these intervention programmes are provided at the end of the document.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Active Change Foundation - Somali Mothers Health Realization - Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES) / Participate, Activate, Communicate, Empowerment and Equality (PEACE) - Bringing Communities Together - Sufi Muslim Council - Faith Matters - Get Involved or Lag Behind - A Common and Safe Future - Meedoen, Bouwen aan Burgerschap - Moroccan Neighbourhood Fathers - Muslim Contact Unit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Get Involved or Lag Behind - Quilliam Foundation - The Channel Project - The Information House - Street Coaches - Operation Comfort - National Community Tension Team 	
Nationalist-separatist terrorism interventions		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Early Release Scheme - European Union Prisoner Welfare Organisations 	
Right-wing terrorism interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aussteigerprogramm für Rechtsextremisten (Programme for Right Wing Extremists) - Hessian Disengagement Programme (IKARus) - Lonsdale News - Day of Dialogue - Extremism in the News - The Colourful City (De kleurrijke stad) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project Exit—Leaving Violent Youth Groups (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany) - The Empowerment Conversation - Aussteigerprogramm für Rechtsextremisten (Programme for Right Wing Extremists) - Winschoten Intervention - All-in Project - Young People Intervention Team (Jongeren Interventie Team) - Nuisance Youth Network (Overlast Jeugd Netwerk) - Hessian Disengagement Programme (IKARus) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -)
Left-wing terrorism interventions		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reincorporation Programme - Operation Christmas 	
Gangs / Criminal violence interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - GREAT - Teens on target - Care Teams for Children and Adolescents - Barcelona Youth Project - Youth Justice Board—Youth Inclusion Programme - PRONASCI—Women for Peace - PRONASCI—Protection of Vulnerable Youth in the Territory - PRONASCI—Reservist Citizen - Breaking the Cycle - Denver Gang Rescue and Support Project (GRASP) - 2XL - Nightravens - Catch - Sport-it - Goal! 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Caught in the Crossfire - Conciliation and Reparation Juvenile Programme - Youth Justice Board—Restorative Justice - Freagarrach Project - Halt - Breaking the Cycle - Denver Gang Rescue and Support Project (GRASP) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Operation Cul de Sac
Interventions within	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Prison Imams 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Afghani deradicalisation interventions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Prisoner Distribution

correction facilities	– Italian deradicalisation interventions	– Iraqi deradicalisation interventions	– Singaporean deradicalisation interventions	– Indicators of Radicalisation manual	Policy			
Early interventions for a peaceful coexistence	– Oasis for Peace	– Givat Haviva Educational Institute	– Hand in Hand Centre for Jewish-Arab Education in Israel	– Friends of the Earth Middle East	– Bustan	– Peres Centre for Peace		
Generic terrorist and/or violent group interventions	– Nightravens	– Catch	– Sport-it	– Goal!	– Seeds of Peace	– Norway Interview Intervention	– Utrecht Police Work Placement	– Federal Bureau of Investigation Sting Operations

C. Results

We analysed the factors reportedly targeted by the interventions, in line with the conceptual framework and the factors identified in the background research. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6. Note that the factors referred to in this table are not necessarily the same as those reported in the literature review since the factors targeted by the interventions are not necessarily those reported most frequently in the literature.

Table 6 shows that some factors are commonly targeted by interventions while others rarely are. This may be partly explained by the fact that some factors are more appropriate to tackle than others, as they are not found amongst the general population, and some are more practical to tackle than others. Moreover, the implementation of interventions depends on a number of factors, including the availability of resources (e.g. clinical and educational methodologies), political will to invest, and the opportunity to work with individuals concerned.

Table 6 also shows that certain types of interventions are hardly or not at all addressed by factors thought to be mainly associated with other types of radicalisation. For example, according to the graph, right wing terrorism interventions hardly address fascination with spirituality and religion, and Islamist terrorist interventions hardly address politicized upbringing. The findings of the literature review, however, show that the application for each intervention should not be shaped only around the radical ideology, but also strongly by each individual participant. The main motivation for a person to join an extremist group is usually not the ideology, but rather that the group is filling a void the individual feels in their life. Therefore, intervention techniques may be used just as successfully in interventions addressing differing types of radicalisation, depending on the context of the individual.

People working in counter-radicalisation interventions should understand the meaning and impact of a breadth of factors in order to address the ones that are relevant depending on the individual with whom they work, not according only to the type of radicalisation. Some of the factors that Table 6 indicates as hardly or not at all

addressed may also reflect a lack of funding. This was mentioned as a concern by many primary sources in later stages of the SAFIRE project.

Table 6. Frequency with which the interventions target factors reported in the literature to be involved in the process of radicalisation

	Factor	Islamist terrorism interventions	Nationalist-separatist terrorism interventions	Right-wing terrorism interventions	Left-wing terrorism interventions	Gangs / Criminal violence interventions	Interventions within correction facilities	Early interventions for a peaceful coexistence	Generic terrorist and/or violent group interventions
Background	Fascination with Spirituality/Religion	◐	○	○	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Prone to Violence	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	◐
	Helping Kin	○	◐	○	◐	○	○	○	○
	Fascination with Leaders	○	◐	◐	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Event Occurrence	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	◐
	Poverty	○	◐	○	○	◐	◐	○	○
	Political Activity	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Politicised Upbringing	○	◐	◐	◐	○	◐	◐	○
	Seeking Int'l Recognition	◐	◐	○	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Fascination with Revolutions	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Employment	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Poor education	○	◐	○	◐	◐	◐	○	○
	Higher education	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Impersonment	◐	◐	○	○	○	◐	○	○
	Unstable upbringing	○	○	◐	◐	◐	○	○	○
	Blaming society	◐	◐	○	○	○	◐	○	○
	Being sociable	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	◐
	Criminality	◐	○	◐	◐	◐	○	○	◐
Proximate	Linking the local to the int'l	◐	○	○	○	○	◐	○	○
	Social influence	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐
	Desensitization	○	○	○	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Event Occurrence	◐	○	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	○
	Search for Meaning	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	◐	○	◐
	Training	○	○	○	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Lacking Political Clout	○	◐	○	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Internet Use	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Reinforcement of an insurgent movement	○	○	○	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Receiving means	○	○	○	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Connection to the group	◐	○	◐	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Forced conscription	○	○	○	◐	○	◐	○	○
Fearing Opponents	○	○	◐	◐	○	◐	○	○	
Immediate	Expressing targets	○	○	◐	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Shared Vision	○	○	○	◐	○	◐	○	○
	Event Occurrence	○	○	◐	◐	◐	◐	○	○
	Obedience	○	○	○	◐	○	○	○	○

◐ = Observed in 75%+ of all observations
 ◑ = Observed in 25 - 50% of all observations

◒ = Observed in 50 - 75% of all observations
 ○ = Observed in 0 - 25% of all observations

Source: ISCA

D. Conclusion

Implications for research

Interpretation of the table: main results

The interventions described provide a source of information for the design of interventions but may not all be directly applicable to the process of radicalisation in Europe. Some may refer to cultural and legal contexts which are not comparable, for example. More research is needed that addresses the effectiveness of these interventions. SAFIRE addresses this issue elsewhere. Measuring effectiveness, however, is challenging for a number of reasons:

- definitions of radicalisation and counter radicalisation are still debated;
- interventions have their own individual goals, so no single measurement of success can be applied across the different interventions;
- interventions tend to exhibit a positive bias towards those in charge; and
- time is needed to properly judge recidivism, so it is still too early to judge recent interventions (Horgan and Braddock 2010).

Implications for policy

The review of the literature suggests that interventions are expected to produce different outcomes in different individuals, and that they should be tailored to each individual to the extent possible. There is no universal checklist for designing interventions.

The literature also reports that individuals from different groups may respond to similar types of interventions. It argues an individual's reasons for supporting an extremist group may differ from the goals of the group; in particular amongst young people, who are likely to be motivated to join an extremist group for social and psychological reasons rather than ideology. This conclusion suggests that it may be appropriate for interventions to be sample-specific rather than group-specific.

Common practice (as reflected in the literature) suggests that key components of an intervention include:

- A framework for depicting the radicalisation process: An intervention should target specific points in the process of radicalisation. It is recommended that an intervention be tailored to individuals to the extent possible and, where applicable, incorporate the activities of extremist groups with which the individual is, or may become, involved.
- An offer of viable alternatives: The literature recommends that these be tailored to the needs of individuals, including: opportunities for education; employment and social belonging; and outlets for dissent.
- An ideological concern: The literature suggests that even when radicalised individuals were not originally motivated by ideology, they may have converted to it, or used it as an excuse for their actions.
- Community inclusion: For counter radicalisation messages to be credible, reported evidence suggests it helps if they are delivered by respected members of the individual's own community, or former extremists.

- Support for the transition period: Past experience (as documented) suggests that the transition away from radical social networks requires alternatives, which the individual may need to build up in parallel before abandoning the former altogether. The literature suggests that this transition should be monitored and then supported through aftercare.

It is important to recognise that these points echo best practice messages associated with generic behaviour, attitude and belief modification methodologies. This suggests that the counter radicalisation intervention process is not intrinsically different from other similar processes of behaviour, attitude and belief modification. However this does not exclude the possibility that specific adaptations from general practice could enhance the effectiveness of counter radicalisation interventions.

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